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COMMENT
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF TREASURY
REGULATIONS FOR TAXPAYING AND
NONTAXPAYING CITIZENS
INTRODUCTION
On January 11, 1971, President Richard Nixon proposed a new
system of liberalized rules for the depreciation of business equipment.1
Pursuant to the President's proposal, the Treasury Department issued
a final set of regulations on June 22, 1971.2 These regulations were
known as the "asset depreciation range" (A.D.R.) system.
Seeking to stimulate the economy and to end criticism of the
A.D.R. system, Congress enacted a provision in the Revenue Act of
1971 which dealt with liberalized depreciation. 3 This new act in essence joined the guideline life system of 19624 with the A.D.R. system5
and labeled the new method of depreciation the "class life" system.
The heart of the new method is embodied in a list of asset guideline
classes, each having a corresponding depreciation range. For example,
heavy construction equipment is in class 15.0 and has a depreciation
1. See Statement by the President Upon Announcing Changes in the Depreciation
Provisions, (Jan. 11, 1971), in 7 Weekly Comp. of Pres. Docs. 58 (1971).
2. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-I1 (1971).
3. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 167(m).
4. Rev. Proc. 62-21, 1962-2 CuM. BULL. 418.
5. See note 2 supra. The relationship between the A.D.R. system and the guideline
life system is summarized in CCH FED. TAX REP. 1700 (1972) as follows:
In 1942, the IRS issued Bulletin F, an item-by-item listing of useful lives for
various types and kinds of assets ( 310E). These prevailed until 1962 when the
IRS prescribed the depreciation guidelines in Rev. Proc. 62-21 ( 1763). The
item-by-item listing was replaced with broad industry classes of assets with shorter
guideline lives. A mechanical procedure-the reserve ratio test-was applied by
agents to determine whether the deduction resulting from these more liberal rates
was in line with the taxpayer's retirement and replacement policies. This test was
complicated. Consequently, many taxpayers did not use the guidelines. To make it
possible for taxpayers electing the guidelines to meet the reserve ratio test, special
transitional rules were set forth in Rev. Proc. 65-13 ( 1767).
In 1971, when many taxpayers were expected to fail the reserve ratio test, the
IRS adopted the Asset Depreciation Range (ADR) System ( 1732A). Then, the
Revenue Act of 1971 authorized a new class life system which would combine most
of the provisions of the ADR System and some parts of the guidelines.
The ADR System is also based on broad classes of assets. Instead of a guideline
life, an asset depreciation range is provided. This rahge is from 20% below to
20% above the guideline lives. For each asset in a class, the taxpayer selects an
asset depreciation period within the range for the class. This period is then treated
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range of four to six years. 6 Thus, to determine depreciation, a taxpayer need only classify his depreciable assets and depreciate within
the range provided. It is a simple method which permits depreciation
up to 20 percent faster than was previously permitted under the guideline life system.
Authority to formulate the list of classes was given to the Treasury
Department. The 1971 addition to the Internal Revenue Code provides that a depreciation allowance should be based upon "the class life
prescribed by the Secretary or his delegate which reasonably reflects
the anticipated useful life of that class of property to the industry or
other group."' 7 To fulfill this task, the Treasury Department created
the Office of Industrial Economics which was charged with calculating and revising the class life system.8 The Treasury Department
issued the first list of class lives in 1972.9
Suppose that in compiling class lives the Treasury Department misjudges the useful life of certain equipment, thereby allowing a faster
write-off of depreciation than is reasonable. For example, if empirical
research shows that heavy construction equipment has a useful life of
15 years (with a depreciation range of 12 to 18 years) instead of the
five years provided by the class life system (with a depreciation range
of four to six years), then use of the class life system would result in
unrealistically rapid depreciation and consequently less tax revenue.
Arguebly, such a misjudgment would not "reasonably reflect the anticipated useful life" as required by the Code. Who would challenge such
a classification? Clearly it would not be the user-he would benefit
from excess depreciation expense. Similarly, it would not be the manufacturer who could boast of the rapid tax depreciation in his sales
campaign. Furthermore, it is unlikely that the government would
challenge the classification, since the expertise of its departments
would be questioned thereby.
for all purposes as the useful life-for computing depreciation, additional first-year
depreciation, investment credit, etc. Under ADR, the taxpayer does not have to
justify his retirement policies. There is no reserve ratio test. Once an asset depreciation period is selected for an asset, neither the taxpayer nor the IRS can change
it. The ADR System applies to assets first placed in service after 1970. The ADR
election is an annual one and applies to the assets first placed in service in each
election year.
6. Rev. Proc. 72-10, 1972 INT. REV. BULL. No. 8, at 16.
7.
INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 167(m)(1).
8. 36Fed. Reg. 11946(1971).
9. Rev. Proc. 72-10, 1972 INT. REV. BULL. No. 8, at 13.
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This paper explores the possibility of subjecting such an administrative ruling to judicial review initiated either by a taxpayer not benefited by the regulation or by a nontaxpayer. For either party to prevail
he must prove that he has standing, that judicial review is available,
and that there is a remedy which he can obtain by judicial review.
I.

STANDING

Standing is an absolute requirement for any suit; without standing
the suit will be dismissed regardless of the merits of the case. The
powers of the federal courts are derived from Article III, which limits
their power to consideration of "cases" or "controversies."1 0 This limitation has given rise to the standing doctrine, which requires that the
'party invoking federal court jurisdiction have "such a personal stake
in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues."" Historically, a plaintiff had standing to sue only if he had suffered a "legal wrong.' 2 To
establish a legal wrong, the plaintiff was required to prove, for example, injury to a property or contract right or to a right conferred by
statute or by the Constitution.' 3 If no obvious legal wrong existed, the
14
plaintiff was denied access to the courts.
The first major change in the law of standing came in 1940 when the
Supreme Court decided FCC v. Sanders Brothers Radio Station.'5 In
Sanders the Court found that an existing radio station had standing to
challenge the action of the FCC in granting a certificate to a new competitor. Standing was based on an express provision of the Federal
Communications Act which permitted any "aggrieved" person to appeal a decision by the Commission granting or denying a license. 16 Thus,

10.
11.

U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).

12. For an analysis of the historical development of standing, see Comment, Judicial Review of Agency Action: The Unsettled Law of Standing, 69 Micr. L. REV. 540
(1971).
13. See Note, 23 VAND. L. REV. 814, 816 (1970).
14. See, e.g., Perkins v. Lukens Steel, 310 U.S. 113 (1940); Tennessee Elec. Power
Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118 (1939); Chicago Junction Case, 264 U.S. 258 (1924). In

Tennessee Electric Power,the Court held that the plaintiff had no right to be free from
government competition; therefore, no legal wrong was sustained when the government
became a competitor, and thus there was no standing.
15. 309 U.S. 470 (1940). .
16.

47 U.S.C. § 402(b) (1964), quoted in 309 U.S. at 476-77.
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even though there was no legal right to be free from competition,17
the statute expressly allowed the suit.
However, unlike the Federal Communications Commission, many
agencies are not created with express statutory review provisions. To
remedy this situation, Congress passed the Administrative Procedure
Act. 18 This act provides: 19
A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely
affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute is entitled to judicial review thereof.
Since this section of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) distinguishes between those persons suffering a "legal wrong" and those
persons "adversely affected or aggrieved within the meaning of a relevant statute," the APA might seem to provide a more liberal standard
of review than the "legal wrong" test. 20 Indeed, this position has been
urged by one of the leading commentators in the field. 2 ' However, the
early decisions of the lower courts held that the APA merely formal22
ized the existing test for standing, the "legal wrong" test.
Except for the case of Hardin v. Kentucky Utilities Co.,23 the law
of standing remained static until recently when the Supreme Court
decided Flast v. Cohen,24 Association of Data Processing Service
Organizations,Inc. v. Camp,25 and Barlow v. Collins.26 In these three
opinions, the Court revamped traditional notions of standing.
In Flast, federal taxpayers sought to enjoin enforcement of an act
authorizing federal expenditures to finance teaching and acquisition of
materials for religious courses in religious and sectarian schools. The
17. See note 14 supra.
18. 5 U.S.C. § 701 (1970).
19. Id. § 702 (1970).
20. For a more thorough discussion of the relevant court decisions evidencing intent
to move away from the "legal wrong" test see notes 12 and 13 supra.
21. This is substantially the position asserted by Professor Davis. See 3 K. DAVIS.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 22.08 (1958).

22. See, e.g., Kansas City Power & Light Co. v. McKay, 225 F.2d 924 (D.C. Cir.
1955).
23. 390 U.S. 1 (1968). Hardin involved a challenge by suppliers of electricity to
competition by the TVA. The Court based standing on § 15d of the TVA Act Amendment of 1959, 16 U.S.C. § 83 1n-4(a) (1970), which represents a legislative intent to protect a "competitive interest." For a discussion of Hardin, see Tucher, The Metamorphosis of the Standing to Sue Doctrine, 17 N.Y.L.F 911, 925 (1971).
24. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
25. 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
26. 397 U.S. 159(1970).
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plaintiffs relied on their status as taxpayers for standing. In an opinion
by Chief Justice Warren, the Court held that the plaintiffs had
standing and in so holding created a new test to determine standing.
The Court reasoned that the standing requirement was necessary to
ensure that the plaintiff's interest in the suit was sufficient to create a
case or controversy.2 7 To gauge whether the plaintiff's interest was
28
sufficient, the Court established a two-fold test:
First, the taxpayer must establish a logical link between that status and
the type of legislative enactment attacked.... Secondly, the taxpayer
must establish a nexus between that status and the precise nature of
the constitutional infringement alleged.
In Data Processing the Comptroller of the Currency, pursuant to
the National Bank Act,2 9 promulgated a rule which authorized national banks to provide data processing services. Claiming injury to its
interests as a competitor now deprived of potential clientele, the Association of Data Processing Service Organizations challenged the
ruling. Barlow involved a ruling of the Secretary of Agriculture which
amended section 402(a) of the Food and Agriculture Act of 1965.30
Although the amendment actually expanded the power of farmers to
assign government benefit payments "as security for cash advanced to
finance making a crop,"3 1 it redefined "making a crop" to include rent
paid. 32 The result was that landlords demanded an advance assignment of the government benefits as a condition to obtaining a lease to
work the farm. The amendment was challenged by farmers who were
adversely affected.
In both Data Processingand Barlow the Court upheld the petitioners' claim of standing but in the process established a rather abstruse
two-fold test: (1) the plaintiff must have suffered an "injury in fact,
economic or otherwise, '3 3 and (2) the plaintiff must assert interests
which are "arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or
'34
regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question.

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Flast v. Cohen, supra note 24, at 102.
Id. at 102.
12 U.S.C. § 21-215(b) (1964), as amended, 12 U.S.C. (Supp. V, 1965-69).
7 U.S.C. § 1444(d) (1955).
(1964), as amended, 12 U.S.C. (Supp. V, 1965-69).
20 Fed. Reg. 6512
7 C.F.R. § 709.3 (1972).
397U.S. at 152.
397 U.S. at 153.
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Thus the Flast test of standing is different from that of Data Processing and Barlow. However, since standing is arguably a requirement
stemming from Article III of the Constitution, 35 there must be a test
which states the constitutional minimum. The Court in Data Processing apparently interpreted the Flast test 36 to require only "injury in
fact" 37 as a constitutional minimum, overlooking Flast's two-fold test
38
for determining when a sufficient personal stake exists.
In fact, even if the constitutional minimum for standing is "injury
in fact," a plaintiff cannot claim standing on that basis alone. In Data
Processing, the court also required a showing that the plaintiff's interest was within the zone of interests sought to be protected by the
statute in question. This added requirement reflects a policy decision
that not every type of injury deserves redress.
It seems clear that only the first nexus required by Flast deals with
injury in fact, while the second nexus narrows the type of interest the
plaintiff must have in order to have standing. Thus he must show a
specific constitutional limitation on the challenged legislative action. It
may be that what Data Processing classified as "injury in fact" was
meant to be the equivalent of the two-fold test in Flast. Justice
Douglas did not clarify this point-rather he sought to distinguish
Data Processing and Flast on the basis of their facts, the former being
a competitor's suit, the latter a taxpayer's suit, 3 9 and thus create a dif40
ferent test for standing in Data Processing.
35. See note 10 and accompanying text supra.
36. See text accompanying note 28 supra.
37. 397 U.S. 159, 172 (1970). Justice Brennan, concurring in part and dissenting in
part, further defined "injury in fact" by stating:
[F] or purposes of standing, it is sufficient that a plaintiff allege damnum absque
injuria, that is, he has only to allege that he has suffered harm as a result of the defendant's action. Injury in fact has generally been economic in nature, but it need
not be ....

Id. at 172 n.5 (emphasis added).
38. See text accompanying note 28 supra.
39. Ass'n of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150,

152 (1970).
40. The test developed in Data Processing is set forth in the text accompanying
notes 33-34 supra. It is difficult to relate the "injury in fact" language in Data Processing to the test in Flast. Arguably, the Flast test does establish the conditions under
which the taxpayer is injured, but the second nexus required in Flast, showing a specific
constitutional limitation in the taxing and spending powers, is unrelated to the plaintiffs injury. Rather, this second nexus focuses more closely on the type of interest alleged by the plaintiff. Thus, it seems that the first nexus in Flast equates with the Data
Processing "injury in fact," while the second nexus is roughly equivalent to the Data
Processing"zone of interests" test, at least in focusing more closely on the nature of the
plaintiffs interest.
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A party challenging a class life depreciation determination by the
Secretary immediately is confronted with the problem of deciding
which test for standing is applicable. This problem is particularly
acute for the taxpayer because of the confusing distinction between
taxpayer and competitor suits drawn in Data Processing.4 1 Although
by no means clear, an attack of a depreciation ruling by the Secretary
would probably be governed by the standing test set forth in Data
Processing.Flast involved a challenge to the constitutionality of a federal statute authorizing federal expenditures; consequently, the Flast
test is so narrowly tailored to that precise factual pattern that it
cannot be applied meaningfully to a nonconstitutional challenge of
administrative action. The fact that Data Processing distinguished
Flast as a taxpayer's suit does not necessarily indicate that taxpayers
involved in any kind of suit are limiied to the Flast test. The distinguishing language of Data Processing makes more sense if interpreted
to distinguish Flast not only because a taxpayer sued, but also because
a taxpayer challenged the constitutionality of a federal statute. Thus
the party challenging the Treasury Secretary's depreciation class lives
is involved in an administrative law controversy, and his standing
should be determined by the standards announced in the administrative law cases-DataProcessingand Barlow.42 This conclusion is buttressed by the fact that the APA is applicable to the hypothetical case
posed by this comment but was not applicable in Flast.43 Thus, a
plaintiff must come within the Data Processing test. He must show
both injury in fact and that he comes within the zone of interests
sought to by protected or regulated by the statute in question.
41.

See text accompanying-note 39 supra.

42. Thus in Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp, 408 F.2d 1147 (1st Cir. 1969), the court
stated:
Flast v. Cohen was not intended to have any major reshaping effect outside the area

of standing determinations under Article III for taxpayer suits challenging the constitutionality of a federal taxing and spending statute. Such an approach to
standing as used in Flast-onefocusing solely upon an assessment of the degree of
adversity and clarity of the particular case-if applied to questions of administrative law standing would disturb the entire judicial relationship to the administrative as presently understood by Congress.
Id. at 1152. But see Troutman v. Shriver, 417 F.2d 171 (5th Cir. 1969).
43. The Administrative Procedure Act §§ 551(1)(A), and 701(b)(1)(A), 5 U.S.C.

(1970), excludes Congress from its definition of agency. Since any attack on the constitutionality of a federal statute is necessarily a review of Congressional action, the Administrative Procedure Act does not apply.
However, apparently the petitioners' claim in Flast also was based on a non-

constitutional challenge--that the defendants (Secretary of HEW and Commissioner
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Injury in Fact

Although the cases following Data Processing have allowed a wide
range of injuries to suffice for injury in fact, 44 it is difficult to determine whether a taxpayer not receiving the challenged favorable treatment, or a nontaxpayer in the hypothetical posited by this comment
has suffered an injury sufficient to constitute injury in fact. In seeking
to establish injury in fact, the taxpayer and nontaxpayer have essentially different problems.
The taxpayer who asserts that he must pay more taxes because of
the favorable depreciation treatment afforded others is confronted by
the line of cases stemming from Frothinghamv. Mellon,45 which hold
that a federal taxpayer has no standing to challenge the constitutionality of a federal spending statute. The Frothingham rationale is
that the monetary interest of a federal taxpayer in an expenditure pro46
gram is not sufficient to ensure the necessary adversary interest. If
that same rationale can be applied to challenges of administrative action the federal taxpayer may not have sufficient monetary interest to
give him standing.
However, Frothinghamhas been the subject of much criticism from
the commentators. 47 Moreover, the Supreme Court broadened the
of Education) were not authorized by the Elementary and Secondary Education Act
of 1965 to approve the federal expenditures in question. The APA certainly seems
applicable to this latter portion of the complaint. But since the Court in its opinion totally ignored this issue, Flast is not authority for any assertions concerning the applicability of the APA. Hence, considerations about APA applicability should be determined
without regard to the Flast opinion. See K. DAvis, supra note 21, § 22.09-1 (Supp.
1970).
44. See P.A.M. News Corp. v. Hardin, 440 F.2d 255 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (agricultural
data news wire services had standing to challenge a government service in competition);
Serritella v. Engelman, 339 F. Supp. 738 (D.N.J. 1972) (plaintiffs had standing to challenge reduction or termination of welfare benefits); Atlee v. Laird, 339 F. Supp. 1347
(E.D. Pa. 1972). In Atlee the court held that plaintiffs had standing to challenge a federal
expenditure. The court stated, "For an economic injury to qualify as a sufficient personal
stake, it need not be of any particular magnitude." Id. at 1355. For a thorough compendium of other cases, see Dugan, Standing to Sue: A Commentary on Injtry in Fact,
22 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 256 (1971).
45. 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
46. Id. at 451.
47. K. DAvis, supra note 21, § 22.09. Professor Davis argues that the Frothingham
holding is wrong for four reasons:
(1) Reasons relied on by the Supreme Court in the Frothingham opinion are contrary to the facts about our present tax system; (2) the law of the state courts is
overwhelmingly and even almost uniformly opposed to the Supreme Court's doctrine; (3) the fact that the Supreme Court before developing the Frothinghamdoctrine upheld the standing of federal taxpayers shows that nothing in the Constitu-
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Frothingham rationale in Flast v. Cohen.48 In Flast, the Supreme
Court held that federal taxpayers did have standing to challenge the
constitutionality of a federal spending program. 49 Although its statement was ambiguous, 50 the Court held that a taxpayer has standing
even if he alleges only monetary injury. If the monetary interest in
Flast is sufficient to confer standing, the taxpayer in the posited hypothetical probably would have standing. 51 Further, although no specific
language to that effect is found in Flast, the Court arguably decided
the Frothingham barrier should be lowered because, as a matter of
policy, some federal taxpayers have a sufficiently adverse interest to
be proper parties in a suit. This more liberal policy in favor of
standing should be extended to other situations which likewise merit
an expansion of the number of parties entitled to sue. In the context of
the hypothetical case, the very fact that no one else is in a position to
challenge the Secretary's determination indicates that the law of
standing should be liberalized to permit a taxpayer to challenge the
favorable treatment afforded another taxpayer. Since the precise test
of Flast does not fit our situation, 52 the courts may be persuaded to
take one step beyond Flast by recognizing a taxpayer's standing to
tion compels the denial of such standing; and (4) to the extent that taxpayer is denied standing to challenge administrative action in making an expenditure which
adversely affects the taxpayer in fact, the Administrative Procedure Act is violated.

For further criticism, see 17 N.Y.L.F. 911, supra note 23.
48. See note 24 supra.
49.

See text accompanying notes 24-28 supra.

50. Arguably, the claimants in Flast had both a monetary interest and a religious
interest in the litigation. However, the correct analysis seems to be that they alleged only

the monetary interest and hence only monetary injury. Professor Davis states that in
Flast the taxpayer's monetary interest is sufficient for standing. He reaches that conclu-

sion for two reasons:
(1) the Supreme Court in Everson v. Bd. of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947) and Doremus v. Bd. of Education 342 U.S. 429 (1952) had already established that the

necessary interest was a good faith pocket-book (monetary) interest, and
(2) the plaintiffs in Flastclaimed neither religious injury nor religious interests.
K. DAViS, supra note 21, § 22.09-4 (Supp. 1970).

The first reason is subject to the criticism that the cases cited dealt with state, not federal, taxes. Before Flast, the Supreme Court maintained that local taxpayers had
standing whereas federal taxpayers did not. See, e.g., Frothingham v. Mellon, supra note

45.
51. The monetary injury in Flast was that portion of the total money spent by the
federal spending program that could be attributed to the plaintiffs' taxes. Undoubtedly

this sum is very slight. It has been estimated that the economic injury to the average federal taxpayer in Flast amounted to twelve cents. Davis, Standing: Taxpayers and Oth-

ers, 35 U. Cm. L. REv. 601, 611 (1968). It should be noted again that in a situation such
as the posited hypothetical, the second nexus requirement in Flast is inapplicable as it is
geared toward constitutionalattacks on federal spending programs.
52. See notes 41, 42 and accompanying text supra.
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challenge an arbitrary decision of an administrator solely on a
showing of monetary injury.
The nontaxpayer challenging the Secretary's action will encounter
even greater difficulty in showing injury in fact because a nontaxpayer
cannot claim monetary injury. However, the nontaxpayer can assert
two interests that may entitle him to standing: first, he may at some
future time become a taxpayer and thus be injured in the same fashion
as the taxpayer; and second, all citizens have a general interest in
seeing our laws properly enforced, and more specifically in preventing
arbitrary action by administrators.
The first of these interests is supported by the recent case of Environmental Defense Fund v. Hardin.53 In Hardin, five young mothers
who either presently breastfed or intended in the future to breastfeed
their babies challenged an administrative determination of the permissible use of DDT. The court held that the women had standing based
on their contingent interest. However, any contingent interest may be
subject to the objection that it is too remote to constitute injury in
fact.
The second interest is essentially what is known as the "private attorney general" notion-that private citizens should have standing to
challenge government action, especially when it appears likely that
there are no other challengers. Best among the articles which discuss
55
this interest 54 is that of Professor Jaffe, who argues:
From the very beginning both our Constitution and our practice has
sought to protect the individual qua individual and qua member of a
minority from the abuse of power by the majority or by government in
the name of the majority, despite the fact that majority rule through
representation is the central institution of our democracy. Furthermore, democracy in our tradition emphasizes citizen participation as
much as it does majority rule. Citizen participation is not simply a vehicle for minority protection, but a creative element in government and
lawmaking. The usual taxpayer and citizen suit is thoroughly consistent
53. 428 F.2d 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
54. Other commentaries that discuss the private attorney general notion are: Berger,
Standing to Sue in Public Actions: Is It a Constitutional Requirement?, 78 YALE L.
816 (1969); Comment, Standing of Conservation Groups as Conservation Groups: An
ExpandingRight?, 66 Nw. U.L. REV. 554 (1971); Note, Citizen OrganizationsIntervening
in Federal Administrative Proceedings: The Lingering Issue of Standing, 51 B.U.L.
REV. 403 (1971).
55. Jaffe, The Citizen as Litigant in Public Actions: The Non-Hohfeldian or IdeologicalPlaintiff 116 U. PA. L. REV. 1033, 1045 (1968).
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with the primacy of majority rule. The issue will be the statutory authority of the official action, and the lawsuit itself will be prescribed
by statute.
Obviously, such statements delineate a policy of standing which
goes to the nature of American society and calls for a redefinition of
the role that the courts (and thus citizens) play in the fabric of our so56
ciety. Similar notions of standing have prevailed in several cases,
although not with the far-reaching consequences desired by those that
adhere to Professor Jaffe's point of view. However, the private attorney general argument may be jeopardized by a recent United States
57
Supreme Court decision, SierraClub v. Morton.
The Sierra Club, whose goals include the preservation of the environment, sought a declaratory judgment and an injunction to restrain
the Secretary of the Interior from approving a resort planned by Walt
Disney Enterprises, Inc., to be built in the Sequoia National Forest. In
attempting to prove standing, the Sierra Club did not allege injury to
itself or its members; rather the injury claimed was that the development "would destroy or otherwise affect the scenery, natural and historic objects and wildlife of the park and would impair the enjoyment
of the park for future generations. 5 8s The Sierra Club sought standing
under a private attorney general argument, claiming that the suit was
a "public" action and that the club's longstanding interest and expertise with such matters were sufficient to give it standing as a public
representative.
The Court agreed that the plaintiff's allegations were serious
enough to constitute injury in fact under the APA, but the Court required injury in fact to the person or persons suing.59 In so holding,
the Court rejected any notion that the "special interest" of the Sierra
Club made it a representative party to bring the suit on behalf of the
60
public:
[A] mere "interest in a problem," no matter how longstanding the
interest and no matter how qualified the organization is in evaluating
the problem, is not sufficient by itself to render the organization "ad56. See the cases cited in Justice Blackmun's dissenting opinion in Sierra Club v.
Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 760 n.1 (1972).
57. 407 U.S. 727 (1972).
58. Id.at735n.8.
59. Id. at 735.
60. Id. at 739.
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versely affected" or "aggrieved" within the meaning of the APA.
...But if a "special interest" in this subject were enough to entitle Sierra Club to commence this litigation, there would appear to be
no objective basis upon which to disallow a suit by any other bona fide
"special interest" organization, no matter how small or short-lived.
And if any group with a bona fide "special interest" could initiate such
litigation, it is difficult to perceive why any individual citizen with the
same bona fide special interest would not also be entitled to do so.
This holding contradicts the trend of lower court opinions which
allow the private attorney general notion to confer standing to sue on
behalf of the public interest. 61 Recognizing that standing is a constitutional restriction designed to ensure a proper representative, the Sierra
Club Court reasoned that unless a "particular" plaintiff has been injured, that plaintiff cannot be a proper party to sue. 62 The Court
seemed to recognize that in this particular instance Sierra Club would
have pursued the case with the requisite vigor, 63 but feared that a liberal holding would open the courts to many plaintiffs with a so-called
''special interest" who would not adequately represent the public.
The desire to limit access to those persons who will press the action
adequately is certainly respectable. However, one may wonder
whether the criteria of Sierra Club-injury in fact to the particular
plaintiff-is an appropriate measure of a plaintiff's merits as proponent of the claim. A test which denies standing to such an obviously
able plaintiff as the Sierra Club, while granting standing to a less able
plaintiff merely because that particular plaintiff is injured in fact,
misses the mark. 64 The Constitution only requires that the plaintiff be
a person whose interests are sufficiently adverse to ensure adequate
representation. 65 This adversity can be ensured without the Sierra
61. See notes 54-56 and accompanying text supra.
62. The Sierra Club Court followed the Data Processing test for standing and decided the case solely on the first part of that test, injury in fact. Data Processing made it
clear that injury in fact was the only constitutional requirement flowing from Article
III. 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970). Thus the Sierra Club holding on the standing issue was
probably a matter of constitutional law.
63. 405 U.S. at 739.
64. To highlight the potential absurdity of this result, Professor Davis posits the following example:
[T] he best law firm in the country ... lacks standing to get an adjudication of law
when neither it or its client has any interest at stake.... [A] n illiterate pauper who
refuses legal assistance obviously has standing to challenge a $10 fine imposed on
him, no matter how badly he may present his case.
K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT § 22.04 (3d ed. 1972).
65. See note II and accompanying text supra.
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Club test of injury in fact to the particular plaintiff. Perhaps the
proper approach to standing is for the courts to adopt a case by case
analysis and accept evidence as to the appropriateness of the particular plaintiffs allegation of standing rather than handling the question
66
in such a mechanical fashion.
At any rate, if the courts continue to apply the SierraClub analysis,
a nontaxpayer challenging arbitrary action by the Secretary probably
will be precluded from basing his standing on the private attorney
general notion.
B.

Zone of Interests

Having demonstrated that he is "injured in fact," the plaintiff must
show that his interests are "arguably within the zone of interests to be
protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in
question.16 7 This requirement has been severely criticized by commentators 68 as being irrelevant to the standing issue. However, the
"zone of interests" test probably represents a determination by the
Court that not all injured parties should be compensated through
69
judicial redress.
Assuming that it is necessary to satisfy the "zone of interests" test in
order to have standing to challenge administrative action, the test presents some rather awkward problems, largely because of the impreci66. Professor Davis has offered the following proposal:
A person whose legitimate interest is injured in fact or imminently threatened with
injury by governmental action should have standing to challenge that action in abs-

ence of legislative intent that the interest is not to be protected.
K. DAVIS, supra note 64, § 22.08.
67. Data Processing,397 U.S. at 153.

68. See K. DAvIs, supra note 64, § 22.07.
It should be noted that the dissenters in the Data Processing and Barlow cases
agreed that the "zone of interests" tests had nothing to do with standing. Justice Brennan
thought that the "zone of interests" test should be applied in deciding whether the agency

action was subject to judicial review. See Data Processing,397 U.S. at 170 (dissenting
opinion).
For other commentary critical of the "zone of interests" test, see Comment, Judicial
Review of Agency Action: The Unsettled Law of Standing, 69 MICH. L. REv. 540,
549-68 (1971); Comment, Standing and Administrative Agencies--Expanding Concepts ofJudicialReview, 32 LA. L. REV. 634, 639 (1972).

69.

Courts have imposed limits other than injury in fact from the very beginning of

federal practice under the Constitution. The "legal wrong" test is a very good example.

According to that test, the plaintiff must not only show injury but also must show that
the injury is of a specific nature (e.g., breach of contract). Seg generally Comment, Judicial Review of Agency Action: The Unsettled Law of Standing, 69 MICH. L. REv. 540

(1971).
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sion with which the Court announced the test in Data Processing.7 0 A
preliminary issue is which zone of interest is in question. The language
in Data Processing indicates that the plaintiff must come within the
zone of interests protected by the statute which is the basis of the
claim. But are the interests to be protected limited to those found
within the particular section of the statute which forms the basis of the
claim, or may the whole statute be examined? Indeed, it has been
argued that any statute, even one different from the statute forming
the basis of the suit, that evidences an intent to protect the plaintiffs
interests may properly be analyzed in determining the zone of interests. 71 In the posited hypothetical, both taxpayers and nontaxpayers
probably could argue successfully that they come within the zone of
interests sought to be protected by the provision in question. That section authorizes the Secretary to make "reasonable" rulings.7 2 The
"reasonable" standard probably was added to ensure that the Secretary's rulings did not result in the receipt of either too few or too many
tax dollars. Thus, the likely rationale for the reasonableness limitation
was to preserve the inherent equity in our tax system, sometimes referred to as either "horizontal equity or vertical equity. '7 3 Basically
this means that all citizens in this country, both taxpayers and nontaxpayers, are part of a cohesive whole, and as such have the right to
ensure the equilibrium of the tax system.
The language in Data Processing provides that the plaintiff's interests only arguably need come within the zone of interests. The use of
the term "arguably" evidences an intent to allow a wider range of interests to satisfy this test than just those interests which clearly fall
within the protected zone of interests.7 4 Indeed, the lower court cases
following Data Processing have interpreted the term "zone of

70. One major question is whether the Court meant to include the plaintiffs interest
within the zone or the plaintiff himself. The Court in Barlow stated that the plaintiffs
themselves were within the zone of interests. The outcome of this issue is in doubt.
Id. at 522.
71. Id.
72. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 167(m).
73. Horizontal equity has been stated to be the proposition that "people in equal
position should pay equal amounts of tax." Vertical equity has been defined as the proposition that "people in unequal position should pay different amounts related in a meaningful fashion to difference in position." See Musgrave, In Defense of An Income Tax,
81 HARV. L. REV. 44, 45 (1967).
74.
Comment, JudicialReview of Agency Action: The Unsettled Law of Standing,
69 MICH. L. REV. 540 (1971).
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interests" '7 5 extremely liberally, and some courts have apparently ignored the requirement altogether.7 6 The result is that while the "zone
of interests" standard probably continues as a test, its interpretation
will be quite liberal. As a consequence, it seems that the interest of
both the taxpayer and nontaxpayer in preserving the equity fundamental to our tax code is sufficient to allow these 1potential plaintiffs
to satisfy the zone of interests test.
Having established that the plaintiffs in the posited hypothetical
arguably have standing, we must analyze the other obstacles to a challenge of administrative action: whether judicial review is available at
all, and whether the challenge fits within the scope of review allowable
under the APA.
II.

JUDICIAL REVIEW

Since perusal of the Internal Revenue Code reveals no specific
grant of power to review Treasury Department determinations, any
permissible judicial review must be governed by the APA. The APA
states in part: "A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the
'77
meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof.
This section of the APA was interpreted by the Supreme Court in
Abbot Laboratoriesv. Gardner'8 to create a presumption that judicial
review is allowable. This presumption of judicial review is subject to:
(1) statutes which preclude judicial review, and (2) agency action
which is committed to agency discretion by law. 9 An examination of
these two exceptions is necessary.

75.

See, e.g., P.A.M. News Corp. v. Hardin, 440 F.2d 255 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (the

court gave a summary consideration of the "zone of interests" test, almost completely
ignoring the test); Serritella v. Engleman, 339 F. Supp. 738 (D.NJ. 1972) (the court held
that the plaintiffs had standing to challenge an order reducing and terminating welfare
benefits. The court cited the "zone of interests" test, but did not apply it); Nat'l Ass'n of
Letter Carriers v. Ind. Post. Serv. of Am., Inc., 336 F. Supp. 804 (W. D. Okla. 1971)
(the court held that the interests of the postal carriers were within the "zone of interests"
of the entire postal laws. The court also gave a very loose interpretation based on the

"arguably" standard of Data Processing).
76. See Sierra Club v. Hickel, 433 F.2d 24 (9th Cir. 1970); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v.Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Scanwell Laboratories,
Inc. v. Shaffer, 424 F.2d 859 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
77. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970).
78. 387 U.S. 136 (1967).
79. 5 U.S.C. § 701(1) and (2) (1970).
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Statutory Preclusion

Is judicial review in the posited hypothetical precluded by statute?
Arguably, sections 7421 and 7426 of the Internal Revenue Code call
80
for preclusion. Section 7421 states:
(a)-Except as provided in sections 6212(a) and (c), 6213(a), and
7426(a) and (b)(1), no suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court by any
person, whether or not such person is the person against whom such
tax was assessed.
In Enochs v. Williams Packing and Navigation Co.81 the Supreme
Court stated, "The object of § 7421(a) is to withdraw jurisdiction
from the federal and state courts to entertain suits seeking injunctions
prohibiting the collection of federal taxes." The purpose of the section, the Court continued,-is "to permit the United States to assess and
collect taxes allegedly due without judicial intervention." 8 2 In its analysis the Court did not advocate withdrawing jurisdiction over all suits,
but only over those which would impede the collection or assessment
of the tax. Since the hypothetical suit is a challenge to a ruling which
does not seek to enjoin assessment or collection of a tax, section 7421
probably does not preclude review.
Section 7426 presents a larger hurdle, at least to the nontaxpayer.
This provision outlines the civil actions which may be brought by persons other than taxpayers. Actions for wrongful levy, surplus proceeds
and substituted sale proceeds are permitted. s3 The chief question to be
answered is whether the list is exclusive or whether other actions are
available to the nontaxpayer. If the section is read to exclude all other
actions by nontaxpayers, review of the class life depreciation range of
course is precluded.
In Abbott Laboratoriesv. Gardner 4 the Court read the statutory
85
preclusion section very narrowly:
The question [as to whether there has been statutory preclusion of
review] is phrased in terms of "prohibition" rather than "authori80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
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370U.S. 1,5(1962).

Id.
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7426(a).
387 U.S. 136(1967).
Id. at 140.
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zation" because a survey of our cases shows that judicial review of a
final agency action by an aggrieved person will not be cut off unless
there is persuasive reason to believe that such was the purpose of
Congress.
In Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v.
Camp,8 6 the Court placed emphasis on a statement in the House Report on the APA which concluded: "To preclude judicial review under
[5 U.S.C. § 701] a statute, if not specific in withholding such review,
must upon its face give clear and convincing evidence of an intent to
withhold it. ' 87 In synthesizing these two cases, it appears that the
Court is not likely to find statutory preclusion of review, especially
where there has only been a failure to provide for alternative civil actions in section 7426. Thus, it appears that neither section 7421 nor
section 7426 precludes review.
B.

Preclusion Where Committed to Agency Discretionby Law

The mere fact that review is not precluded by statute does not ensure that review is possible. The APA 88 provides that the review provisions of the Act will not apply if the agency action is committed to
agency discretion by law. The Court, however, has read this exception
quite narrowly. In Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe,
89
the Court stated:
This [5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2)] is a very narrow exception ....

The

legislative history of the Administrative Procedure Act indicates that
it is applicable in those rare instances where "statutes are drawn in
such broad terms that in a given case there is no law to apply."
Section 167(m) of the Internal Revenue Code provides that a class life
prescribed by the Secretary or his delegate should reasonably reflect
the anticipated useful life of that class of property. Although the determination is to be made by the Secretary, his discretion is limited by
the standard of reasonableness embodied in section 167(m). Since this
exception is read very narrowly by the Court and since there is a dele-

86. 397 U.S. 150, 156(1970).
87. See H.R. REP. No. 1980, 70th Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1946).
88. 5U.S.C. § 701(a)(2)(1970).
89. 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971).

469

Washington Law Review

Vol. 48: 453, 1973

gated standard of reasonableness, it appears that this exception likewise does not preclude judicial review.
III.

SCOPE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

Having determined both that plaintiffs may have standing and that
judicial review of the agency action is available, we must determine
the scope of judicial review. The scope of review is governed by the
APA, which provides: 9 0
To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the reviewing
court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional
and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability
of the terms of an agency action. The reviewing court shall(1) compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed; and
(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings and conclusions found to be(a) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise
not in accordance with law;
(b) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege or immunity;
(c) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right ....
The term "agency action" is defined as "the whole or part of an
agency rule, order, license, sanction, relief, or the equivalent or denial
thereof, or failure to act." 9 ' The determination by the Secretary of the
"class lives" which "reasonably reflect the anticipated useful life of
92
that class of property" probably would be considered an agency rule.
Therefore, the Secretary's depreciation class life determinations are
subject to review under the APA.
Although the Secretary's determinations constitute agency action,
90. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1970) (emphasis added).
91. 5 U.S.C. § 551(13) (1970) (emphasis added).
92. The Administrative Procedure Act defines "rule" in 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (1970) as:
[T] he whole or a part of an agency statement of general or particular applicability
and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy or
describing the organization, procedure, or practice requirements of an agency and
includes the approval or prescription for the future of rates, wages, corporate or
financial structures or reorganizations thereof, prices, facilities, appliances, services or allowances therefor or of valuations, costs, or accounting, or practices
bearing on any of the foregoing ....
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the APA limits the theories which may be used to set aside such action. In order to succeed, plaintiffs must allege one of the enumerated
theories.9 3 The basic premise.of the hypothetical suit is that the Secretary's determination is unreasonable because the class life determinations are widely divergent from the actual life of the equipment within
the classification. This challenge may be sustained under two sections
of the APA.9 4 The plaintiff's allegations of an unreasonable determination despite a statutory requirement of reasonableness is in substance an allegation that the Secretary's action is "in excess of statutory
authority, or limitations," one of the enumerated theories in the APA.
Further, if the Secretary's determination has no basis in reality, another theory might be equally applicable, for the Secretary's determination might be "arbitrary" or "capricious" within the meaning of the
APA. Consequently, the allegations of the plaintiffs in the posited
hypothetical are within the scope of judicial review.
IV.
A.

FORMS OF RELIEF
Injunction

Having determined that the plaintiffs may have standing and that
their claims are within the scope of judicial review, the court must
determine whether the cause of action merits relief. While extensive
discussion of the merits of the claim is inappropriate here, if the Secretary's ruling is unreasonable, the fact that Code section 167(m) demands "reasonableness" should be decisive. Assuming a victory on the
merits, there are two basic forms of relief that the petitioners could
seek-injunction and injunction with declaration under the Declara95
tory Judgment Act.
In seeking an injunction, the two largest obstacles facing the petitioner are proving that irreparable injury will follow if an injunction
does not issue and demonstrating that there is no adequate remedy at
93. See text accompanying note 90 supra.
94. The two possible provisions are in APA § 706 (2)(a) and (c). See text accompanying note 90 supra.
95. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201, 2202 (1970). It should be noted that the prohibition in section 7421 of the Internal Revenue Code against enjoining the collection of income taxes
does not impede our hypothetical plaintiffs because they are not seeking to restrain the
collection of taxes but rather seek to restrain the Secretary from enforcing the unreasonable regulation.
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law. Professor Davis, noting that these historical grounds for equitable
relief may be disappearing, states: 96
Injunction as a means of reviewing administrative action has moved
away from its historical foundations in equity and has become a general-utility remedy for use whenever no other form of review proceeding is clearly indicated.
If Professor Davis' position prevails, it is clear that an injunction
would issue in the hypothetical case. However, it is doubtful that the
courts accept Davis' theory. The Supreme Court continues to allude to
the traditional grounds for granting equitable relief. For example, in
Reisman v. Caplin97 the Court denied both declaratory and injunctive
relief based on the existence of an adequate remedy at law.9 8 Therefore, it seems that the historical foundations for such relief have not
been abandoned totally. Accordingly, the court must make a determination as to whether the petitioners' claim satisfies the historical prerequisites.
Irreparable injury is a term with a legal definition that sometimes
does not correspond to its literal meaning. For example, irreparable
injury is defined in Schuetzle v. Duba99 to be damage which cannot be
96. 3 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 23.04 (1958). Professor Davis arrives at his conclusion by analyzing several cases. In Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 288
(1943), the Court granted an injunction "without considering whether the asserted interest in a money fund was entitled to equitable protection." K. DAvIs, supra, at 308. In
United States v. ICC, 337 U.S. 426 (1949), the Court reviewed a denial of reparation
"even though the only question was whether the plaintiff was entitled to a money
award." K. DAVIS, supra, at 308. The three dissenting justices in that case remarked,
"There is a total absence of any of the traditional grounds for equitable relief." 337
U.S. at 460.
Professor Davis does not appear to have changed his conclusion in light of recent
developments. See K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 23.06 (Supp. 1970). In
his 1970 treatise, Davis refers to the Reisman decision but does not comment upon it.
Davis does, however, later refer to the Reisman decision as an "unwelcome exception,"
although he retains his belief that equitable requirements increasingly are ignored. See
K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT § 23.04 (3d ed. 1972).
97. 375 U.S. 440 (1964). In Reisman, the petitioners were attorneys for taxpayers
seeking a declaratory judgment and injunction against the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue and an accounting firm which had been working on the petitioners' financial
records. The Commissioner issued a subpoena duces tecum to the accounting firm directing it to produce all audit reports and work papers in its possession. Petitioners objected to this procedure, claiming that it was an unlawful appropriation of their work
product. The Court dismissed the complaint because the petitioners had an adequate
remedy at law-they could obtain a stay of the order and challenge the summons on any
appropriate ground.
98. See also Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43 (1971).
99. 201 F. Supp. 754 (N.D.S.D. 1962).
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estimated by an accurate, objective standard but only by conjecture; it
"does not have reference to amount of damage caused, but rather to
difficulty... of measuring the amount of the damages inflicted."'10 0
The damage sustained by the petitioners due to the Secretary's erroneous computation is comprehended by this definition. What amount
of money compensates the nontaxpayer plaintiff for a decision by the
Secretary in excess of his authority? Further, it would be impossible to
determine quantitatively the taxpayer plaintiffs increased tax liability
caused by the faulty depreciation class lives promulgated by the Secretary which benefit other taxpayers. Surely the injury is irreparable.
Is there an adequate remedy at law? Generally there is an adequate
remedy when the plaintiff can be compensated sufficiently by money
damages. 0 1 However, it has been held repeatedly that where the ascertainment of damages is extremely difficult or impossible, there is
no adequate remedy at law. 10 2 Further, the existence of a continuous
injury may constitute irreparable injury and render a legal remedy
103
inadequate.
It appears, then, that the petitioners can meet the historical requirements for an injunction. The probable outcome of the proposed suit is
an injunction precluding the Secretary from enforcing the unreasonable class life determination.
B.

DeclaratoryJudgment

Generally an injunction is combined with declaratory relief under
the Declaratory Judgment Act.' 04 However, occasionally the Court
100. Id. at 757 (emphasis added). For other cases holding that irreparable injury
exists when the extent of the injury only is subject to conjecture, see Hines v. Independent School Dist., 380 P.2d 943 (Okla. 1963); United Carbon Co. v. Ramsey, 350
S.W.2d 454 (Ky. Ct. App. 1961).
101. See Odgen River Water Users Ass'n v. Weber Basin Conservacy, 238 F.2d 936
(10th Cir. 1956); Local 499, I.B.E.W. v. Iowa Power & Light Co., 224 F. Supp. 731

(S.D. Iowa 1964).
102. H. MCCLINTOCK, HANDBOOK OF THE PRINCIPLES OF EQurY § 43 (2d ed. 1948).
See also Local 499, I.B.E.W. v. Iowa Power & Light Co., 224 F. Supp. 731 (S.D. Iowa
1964); Simenstad v. Hasen, 22 Wis. 2d 653, 126 N.W.2d 529 (1964).
It can be inferred that the requirements of inadequate legal remedy and irreparable
injury are one and the same. If the fact that damages are unascertainable makes the injury irreparable as well as making the legal remedy inadequate, there seems to be little
merit to the distinction.
103. See W. DEFUNIAK, HANDBOOK OF MODERN EQUITY § 20 (2d ed. 1950).
104. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1970). See K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT § 23.04 (3d
ed. 1972).
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has granted a declaratory judgment and also refused to grant injunctive relief. 105 The Declaratory Judgment Act may be used "in a case
of actual controversy" to decide the rights and other obligations of the
interested parties.' 0 6 In Golden v. Zwickler'0 7 the Court explained:
"[T] he question in each case is whether the facts alleged, under all
circumstances, show that there is a substantial controversy, between
parties having adverse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and
reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment." In the proposed suit, the facts appear to present such a controversy; the injury
threatened is imminent since the regulation is final and can effect income tax returns.
Perhaps the most difficult problem facing the petitioners in pursuit
of a declaratory judgment is the following statutory limitation in the
Declaratory Judgment Act: "except with respect to Federal taxes."' 08
Although this limitation has prevented use of declaratory relief in suits
brought by tax debtors, 09 suits by third party petitioners have been
allowed."10
If the petitioner is to prevail, he should stress his contention that
injunctive relief is available to him. The court in Filopowicz v.
Rothensies'll said, "[I] t would seem clear that if a court of equity
could enjoin the collector for taking illegal action, a federal court similarly should be able to issue a declaratory judgment.... ." In Tomlinson v. Smith"12 the court went even further when it stated that it
would be "unreasonable" to think that a court capable of issuing in105. See Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241 (1967); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S.
294(1964).
106. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1971).
107. 394 U.S. 103, 108 (1969), quoting Maryland Casualty Co. v. Pacific Coal & Oil
Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273 (1941).
108. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1970).
109. See, e.g., United States v. Teitelbaum, 342 F.2d 672 (7th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 831 (1965); England v. United States, 261 F.2d 455 (7th Cir. 1958);
Jolles Foundation, Inc. v. Moysey, 250 F.2d 166 (2nd Cir. 1957).
110. See, e.g., Tomlinson v. Smith, 128 F.2d 808 (7th Cir. 1942); Fine Fashions v.
Moe, 172 F. Supp. 547 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); New York Cas. Co. v. Zwerner, 58 F. Supp.
473 (N.D. Il. 1944). In Tomlinson, a trustee in possession of a partnership, who had
acquired a valid lien on accounts receivable before the Collector of Internal Revenue
acquired any right to social security taxes owed by the partnership, was allowed to seek
an injunction against the tax Collector to restrain him from proceeding in distraint
against customers of the partnership. In Fine Fashions, the court allowed the party
whose property was being levied on by the Collector, but who was not the tax debtor, to
seek restraint of the action.
111. 31 F. Supp.'716, 722 (E.D. Pa. 1940).
112. 128 F.2d at 811.
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junctive relief could not issue declaratory relief. If the petitioner
seeking review of the Secretary's class life determination can enjoin
the use of the regulation, it seems equally unreasonable to deny him
declaratory relief.
It has been suggested that other possible exceptions to this tax limitation be established for revenue rulings'1 3 and closing agreements for
future transactions.' 4 The purpose of the Federal tax limitation is (1)
to keep the initial consideration of tax liability from being transferred
from the Internal Revenue Service to the federal courts, and (2) to
stop the disruption of the orderly collection of taxes." 5 Neither of
these proposed exceptions would disrupt the collection of taxes since
both the revenue ruling (or the closing agreement) and the relief are
granted prior to the transaction. In addition, the consideration of tax
liability still would remain with the Commissioner.
The present case is analogous to the proposed exceptions. Here the
determination as to class lives remains with the Secretary and not with
the courts. If it is argued that the use of the declaratory judgment
would disrupt the orderly collection of taxes,- then the courts should
deny declaratory relief only when a petitioner seeks to avoid his personal tax liability; when other interests are at stake, declaratory relief
should be granted. 1 6 In addition, if the declaratory relief was sought
shortly after the class life regulations became final but prior to the
time that they become effective, much of this argument would become
inapplicable. In conclusion, if the petitioners can persuade the courts
that the underlying basis for the federal tax exception does not really
7
apply, declaratory relief should be granted."1
CONCLUSION
A challenge to the Secretary's depreciation regulations is fraught
113.
Service,
114.
115.
116.

See Goodman, The Availability and Reviewability of the Internal Revenue
113 U. PA. L. REV. 81, 99 (1964).
S. Doc. No. 10, pt. 9,77th Cong., IstSess. 31-35 (1941).
See S. REP. No. 1240, 74thCong., lstSess. 11 (1935).
See McGlotten v. Conally, 338 F. Supp. 448, 453 D.D.C. 1972). In Mc-

Glotten the court found the scope of the phrase "except with respect to Federal taxes" to
be "coterminous with the breadth of the Tax Injunction Act, 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a)." Id.
Thus when the petitioner does not seek to restrain the collector of tax, the exception
does not apply.
117. In addition, the federal tax limitation may not apply when special and extraordinary circumstances exist. See, e.g., Miller v. Standard Nut Margarine Co., 284 U.S.
498 (1932); Jewel Shop ofAbbeville v. Pitts, 218 F.2d 692 (4th Cir. 1955).
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with difficulties. Standing probably is the chief obstacle; the petitioners must overcome the twin test of Data Processing. The taxpayer
must convince the court that the standing concept, which exists to
ensure the adequate presentation of suits, must not be allowed to
create unchecked administrative power. If courts stringently define
taxpayer standing, no one will be able to challenge even the most unreasonable agency regulations. These dire consequences seem sufficient to overcome the hackneyed fear of opening the floodgates to a
multiplicity of lawsuits, a fear which should not be permitted to outweigh the need to provide a means of challenging arbitrary and unauthorized agency action.
For the nontaxpayer, Sierra Club is an additional major obstacle.
However cogent the reasons may be for limiting suits in the Sierra
Club situation, a challenge to arbitrary agency action poses more difficult problems than did Sierra Club. In Sierra Club the petitioner
could easily have been assured of standing by merely alleging injury to
one of its group; in the posited hypothetical, no such easy allegation is
available. The difference should militate in favor of more liberalized
standing law.
The concept of standing may be due for some serious revision. A
system which initially only seeks to ensure properly prepared litigants
and winds up prohibiting suits by such litigants patently needs revision. Problems such as those experienced by the proposed petitioners
should lead the Court to liberalize the standing concept. If suit by the
petitioners is not allowed, the plaintiffs must seek review elsewhere.
But alternatives are few and difficult. Congressional review and action
is unlikely unless the petitioners muster a strong lobby. Hence the
courts must act or administrative agency action will continue unrestricted.
Paul E. Sullivan, Jr.*

*
Member, Washington State Bar Ass'n; B.A., University of Washington, 1969;
J.D., 1972.

476

